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1 Introduction
Since the early 1990’s the department of competition policy of the European Commis-
sion has examined nearly 3500 proposed merger cases as to their compatibility with
the common market. In over 88 percent of the cases the permission to merge has been
granted right away, over 4 percent were granted subject to commitments. In roughly 5
percent of cases a more thorough investigation was conducted. The remaining 3 per-
cent account for withdrawals, referrals to a member state etc. Of these cases 25 percent
led to permissions without obligations, 60 percent were permitted with structural and/or
behavioral obligations and 15 percent of mergers were blocked. The criterion for the
prohibition of a merger is, according to the EU Merger Regulation, the significant im-
pediment of effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it.1
Mergers entailing this effect are to be declared incompatible with the common market.
The aim of this diploma thesis is to assess what factors influenced the decisions of the
European Commission in these respective cases. Which patterns of structural circum-
stances of a merger case are most likely to entail a clearance subject to conditions
and obligations? Are these patterns dependent on the phase2 in which the decision is
made?
To answer these questions one needs to link the merger cases and the corresponding
court verdicts with a data-set containing circumstantial information on the case. Then
one can proceed to examine the relevance of the information to the outcome using
suitable econometric methods. Since the outcomes observed are of a discrete, binary
nature the model we will employ is a probit model; this will allow us to see the impact of
the variables under consideration on the court verdict.
The examination of the determinants of the Commission’s rulings will allow us to draw
conclusions concerning the aims and goals of European competition policy. If the
1See European Commissions’ Merger Regulation (ECMR) Art 2.3.
2For a primer on the phases of the ECMR see section 2.
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Directorate-General for Competition (DG Competition) is exclusively concerned with
the maintenance and restoration of effective competition and the protection of con-
sumer surplus, only variables that are proxies for market power and efficiency gains
should yield significant results in the regression. The finding of other significant factors
would strongly suggest that political and institutional factors influence the Commission’s
decisions.
The schedule is as follows. The next section gives an overview of European merger
policy. Section 3 briefly reviews earlier work on the subject, section 4 proposes some
intuitive predictions regarding possible determinants. Section 5 is concerned with the
methodology, data-sets and variables our model employs. The presentation of the gen-
eral findings can be found in section 6, while section 7 concludes.
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The European Communities Merger Regulation (ECMR) was passed in 1989 and came
into force in September 1990.3 It specifies the scope of intervention and juridical com-
petence of the European Commission in merger cases with a ’community dimension’. In
article 1.2 of regulation 4064/89 a combination is defined to have community dimension
by meeting the following conditions:
(a) the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than
ECU4 5 000 million, and
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the under-
takings concerned is more than ECU 250 million, unless each of the undertak-
ings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide
turnover within one and the same Member State.
That means that from 1990 on all major combinations have been scrutinized by the Eu-
ropean Commission, whereas the importance of national competition authorities has
been severely reduced. In 1997 the above definition was significantly widened by
the passing of regulation 1310/975 which assesses a community dimension even if
a merger does not meet the original two conditions, provided it satisfies the following
four conditions:
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is
more than EUR 2 500 million;
(b) in each of at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all
the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million
3Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings [Official Journal L 395 of 30 December 1989].
4ECU was replaced by Euro in 1998.
5Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 [Official Journal L 180 of 9 July 1997].
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(c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose of point (b), the
aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more
than EUR 25 million; and
(d) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the under-
takings concerned is more than EUR 100 million, unless each of the undertak-
ings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide
turnover within one and the same Member State.
Notice that these definitions also include companies that are located, produce and sell
outside of Europe, as long as their sales to European markets are sufficiently high.
Thus, a merger can be subject to the jurisdiction of more than one competition au-
thority. This has in the past led to diplomatic disgruntlement, most prominently when
the combination of the two US companies General Electric and Honeywell, which was
ratified by American authorities, was blocked by the European Commission.
In recent years, three of the EC’s decisions to prohibit a merger have later been re-
versed by the European Court of First Instance (CFI).6 While these successful appeals
certainly came as a shock for DG Competition, a Green Paper calling for a reform of
the ECMR had been published as early as 2001. The reform was implemented in 2004.
Its most important issues are probably the clarification of ’dominance’, the inclusion of
an efficiency defense7 which might counteract competitive concerns and the reorga-
nization of the Merger Task Force (MTF). The reform has in general been favourably
received, for a detailed review of the reform see Lyons (2004).
Once it has been established that a combination is subject to EC jurisdiction, the merg-
ing parties are obligated to notify the Commission prior to the implementation of the
concentration. On receipt of the notification, the Commission publishes a note in the
Official Journal of the European Communities, where third parties can comment on the
6These cases are: Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Lavel/Sidel.
7For a detailed discussion see Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn (2001).
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proposed transaction. Figure 1 depicts the steps of the procedure that follows notifica-
tion:
After the notification of the Commission (and the receipt of all necessary information),
the so-called phase I proceedings are initiated. The Commission has 25 working days
to evaluate the proposed combination as to its compatibility with the common market.
There are four possible outcomes:
• Art. 6.1a: The combination does not have community dimension and hence is not
subject to review
• Art. 6.1b: The combination does not raise competitive concern and is declared
compatible with the common market
• Art. 6.1c: The combination raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the
common market, initiation of in-depth investigations.
• Art. 6.2: The combination is compatible with the common market subject to obli-
gations to maintain effective competition.
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Should the Commission conclude that an in-depth investigation of the combination
(vulgo phase II) is in order, the timeframe of investigation is prolonged by 90 working
days. At the end of this period, the Commission may issue the following verdicts:
• Art. 8.1: The combination is declared compatible with the common market.
• Art. 8.2: The combination is declared compatible subject to conditions and obli-
gations.
• Art. 8.3: The combination is declared incompatible with the common market.
Evidently, the combination can be cleared subject to conditions and obligations either
in phase I or in phase II. Whether the determinants differ in the respective phases will
be subject of the present study. For an overview of the remedies employed by the EU
see Motta (2003).
The application of Art. 8.3 (prohibition) is justified when the criteria laid down in Art. 2.3
of the ECMR are met. In the revised 2004 Merger Regulation the wording of the article
has been changed to
’A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition,
in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result
of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared
incompatible with the common market’
where ’dominance’ has been defined as
’. . . a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which en-
ables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant
market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent indepen-
dent of its competitors, customers and ultimately of consumers’
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by the European Court of Justice.8
The pre-2004 practice, called the dominance test (DT), required the creation or strength-
ening of a dominant position as an absolute prerequisite for the prohibition of a business
combination.9 It has been argued that the DT shows deficiencies in cases of collective
dominance and tacit collusion and that the SLC (substantial lessening of competition)
test employed by the United States’ Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would be prefer-
able.10 After the 2004 reform, the test used by the European Commission would be
most accurately described as a significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC)
test.
The last two verdicts signify that the Commission has serious doubts regarding the
concentration’s compatibility with the common market. In these cases, the Commission
must communicate its concerns to the merging parties, which have the right to express
their perspective of the subject matter at a hearing.
8United Brands(27/67, E.C.R. 207, para. 65).
9Lyons (2004) shows how this can be the source of erroneous judgements.
10For a comparison of European and US merger policies see Bergman et al. (2007).
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The economic literature on mergers is relatively abundant and growing. Large parts
of it are devoted to explore issues such as firms’ incentives to merge, the effects of
mergers on the market or in how far efficiency gains counterweigh market power. The
empirical literature in the field is usually concerned with the impact of mergers on the
market structure and tries to classify mergers as being pro-collusive or efficient.11
There is a rather long list of merger event studies in the Anglo-Saxon region and in
recent years similar work has been conducted for European mergers. These papers
usually either study a single, controversial merger case and evaluate it economically
or they structure a sample of merger cases by chronologically important dates12 to
evaluate the effect of the new information being released at these dates on the market.
While the effectiveness of merger remedies has been studied for almost 40 years13, the
determinants of competition authorities’ decisions have not yet been fully explored from
an economic point of view.14 The first papers in this strand of research have been put
forward in the early 1990-ies, papers dealing with the EU’s competition authority have -
due to lack of data - only in recent years been able to take an econometric approach to
the issue.
Studies using discrete-choice statistical models to investigate merger decisions have
been conducted by Coate and McChesney (1992) for the US, Khemani and Shapiro
(1993) for Canada and by Weir (1992) for mergers in the UK.
11For a good example of this see Gugler et al. (2003).
12Usually the merger announcement, the notification of the Commission and the verdict.
13See for example Elzinga (1969) or Ellert (1976). For an in-depth evaluation of the effectiveness of
European merger remedies we refer the reader to the Merger Remedies Study conducted by DG
Competition in 2005.
14Although there is a range of legal literature on the subject.
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A more recent example is Duso, Neven and Ro¨ller (2006), investigating the EU’s deci-
sion in 164 merger cases. Using the reaction of competitor’s stock market prices, they
evaluate the degree of pro- or anti-competitiveness of a merger. They then employ a
probit model over the pro- and anti-competitive subsamples to estimate the frequency
of type I (prohibition of a pro-competitive merger) and type II (clearance of an anti-
competitive merger) errors in the verdicts. Their findings indicate that about half of the
mergers given unconditional clearance were evaluated as anti-competitive by the stock
market and that the decisions of DG Competition cannot solely be explained by the
motivation of protecting consumer surplus. Its decisions are, however, not sensitive to
the interests of firms.
Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2004) address the problem of multiple competition authorities
judging the same case and study the probability of a merger case in the EU going to
phase II. They use a logit model to examine phase II cases handled by DG Competition
since 1990. The results indicate, that the price movements around the initial announce-
ment of the merger are an indicator of the likelihood of a phase II investigation and of
the final regulatory decision and that there is no discrimination between European and
non-European firms.
Bergman, Jakobsson and Razo (2005) adress similar questions as this paper does:
employing a logit model over a sample of 96 merger cases they estimate the likelihood
of going to phase II or prohibition decision as a function of market-relevant and political
variables. Their findings are compatible with the public interest hypothesis: Decisions of
the EU Commission are only influenced by variables that directly affect welfare. In both
models (likelihood of phase II and likelihood of prohibition) the probability of intervention
increases with the market share of the companies involved. Dummy variables indicating
the possibility of post-merger joint dominance and the existence of entry barriers are
also relevant. Political/institutional variables are not significant.
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In a very recent paper Bougette and Turolla (2006) analyze the characteristics of a
merger case for unconditional clearance and clearance subject to conditions and obli-
gations. Their sample of 229 merger cases is analyzed using three different, sophis-
ticated multinomial-logit specifications accounting for up to eight different outcomes.15
They also employ a special class of self-organized maps - Kohonen’s maps - to make
the ’closeness’ of two respective cases apparent in topological terms. Among their
results are significant industry- and country-effects on verdicts as well as political influ-
ences.
15The authors differentiate between phase I/II, remedy/no remedy and structural/behavioural remedy.
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The main question we will investigate can be put as follows: ’Which factors influence
the likelihood of a permission subject to obligations?’. Furthermore we would like to
examine possible differences in the determinants of the outcomes of phase I and phase
II proceedings. We will thusly present three sets of results for each of our investigations:
one concerning only the effect on phase I conditions and obligations, one concerning
the effect on the phase II outcome and one concerning the overall effect. Since the
European Commission has blocked only 19 mergers so far, the determinants for the
blocking of a merger cannot be reliably econometrically estimated.
We will examine a number of propositions in relation with the economic and political
circumstances of a merger. By verifying or falsifying these propositions we will hopefully
be able to shed some light on the above question.
Proposition 1
It seems reasonable to assume that mergers up to a certain size have less potential to
restrain effective competition in a given market and are thusly examined in lesser detail.
Mergers that do not exceed a certain financial threshold or lack a community dimen-
sion of sufficient importance (measured by the amount of trade with EU members other
than the company’s country of origin) are delegated to national competition authori-
ties. Mergers that only scarcely fulfill the criteria to be handled by the EU Commission
evidently have less impact on market structure than those conducted by companies
holding a significant market share in the common market.
This can be formulated as the proposition that the firm sizes and the deal size of a
given merger increase the likelihood of regulatory intervention. If this proves to be true,
both the likelihood of an in-depth investigation and of conditions and obligations should
increase with the size of the companies concerned.
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It would be preferable to test for the interdependency of case outcome and market
share instead of firm or deal size, because it is a better indicator for market dominance
than plain size. Regrettably, market shares are not included in the data-base employed,
therefore size will have to suffice as a proxy for market share.
Proposition 2
The notion of failing firm defense is included in European and American merger law,
but rarely applied. The basic idea is that a merger should be cleared if the target of the
merger is not viable on its own. While this may be contested on the grounds of economic
theory, the approach is justifiable from a political point of view (e.g. the preservation of
employment).
According to European merger law, the definition of this concept is that it
’. . . enables the Commission to clear a concentration even though a domi-
nant position is created or strengthened in its aftermath, provided that there
is no causal link between the concentration and the dominant position, that
is to say the merger does not lead to a deterioration of the competitive struc-
ture of the market. The Commission has developed the following criteria for
the application of the rescue merger concept : (1) The undertaking to be
acquired must be failing (i.e. it would in any event be forced out of the
market). (2) There is no alternative buyer who could provide for a less
anti-competitive solution. (3) The market share of the acquired undertak-
ing would, in any event, be taken over by the acquiring undertaking, or its
assets would inevitably exit the market if not taken over by another under-
taking.16’
16Commission Decision of 14 December 1993 in case IV/M.308 - Kali+Salz (OJ L 186, 21.7.1994, p. 38),
Commission Decision of 11 July 2001 in case COMP/M.2314 - BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim.
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In concord with this definition, we would expect a positive correlation of the outcome
with the targets income. This would imply that strongly negative income - which seems
to be a reasonable proxy for a firm to be ’failing’ - decreases the probability of merger
intervention.
Proposition 3
Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2006) find statistical evidence, that the European Commission
is protectionist in the sense that the amount of harm dealt to European competitors of
a merging entity increases the chance of intervention. It increases even further, if the
bidding firm is non-European. This harms European consumers who bear the burden
of the market power of firms fostered by this practice.
This finding is, however, to be regarded with caution: Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2004)
find that non-European companies have a slightly increased probability of being subject
to an in-depth investigation, but that they are not treated differently with respect to the
final decision of the Commission. The result that the cumulative average abnormal
returns around the announcement date of a merger of non-European firms substantially
exceed those of European firms is discarded as a ’puzzle’ in Aktas et al. (2004) and
reinterpreted as a ’troubling trait of European regulators’ (with respect to the allegation
of protectionism) in Aktas et al. (2006).
The subject remains controversial: Accusations of protectionism were put forward when
the GE/Honeywell merger was blocked by the EU Commission in 2001, despite having
already been cleared by US authorities (see for example Priest and Romani (2001)
or Varian (2001)). Contrarily, Bergman, Jakobsson and Razo (2005) do not find any
statistical evidence of discrimination against non-European companies, neither in terms
of the likelihood of a phase II investigation, nor in terms of the likelihood of prohibition.
To see whether our data-set does or does not confirm the allegation of protectionism,
we will check for the effect of the nationality of bidder and target on the outcome. This
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procedure resembles the approach of Bergman et al. (2005) but is considerably less
sophisticated than the approach of Aktas et al. (2006), where a two-step instrumental
approach is used to take care of the endogeneity problem between market price move-
ments and the regulatory action of the Commission. A significant result would thus
imply a certain robustness of their findings, whereas a non-significant result cannot be
regarded as a refutation.
Proposition 4
Like most things, the amount and strictness of competition policy deemed necessary
is a matter of personal taste. Since our data range back to the early 1990’s, we will
compare the ’strictness’ of competition policy conducted by Mario Monti (1999 - 2004)
with those of Karel van Miert (1993 - 1999), his predecessor, and Leon Brittan (1989 -
1993), the predecessor of the latter. Neelie Kroes has headed DG Competition since
2004 and up to now roughly 1000 cases have been dealt with under her direction.
However, since our data-set for market data only ranges up to 2002, we will have to
omit this time period.
This question is particularly interesting since earlier analyses of these ’political’ influ-
ences have reached different, conflicting conclusions. See for example Schinkel et al.
(2006), Bougette and Turolla (2006) or Bergman et al. (2005).
To test for this, we will regress the merger outcomes on time dummies representing
the respective commissioners and check if they differ considerably. If our findings are
significant we can conclude that the individual Commissioners for Competition have
been able to leave their personal mark on their period of heading DG Competition.
Proposition 5
Another interesting question is whether the jurisdiction of the Commission discriminates
between industries. In Europe, this might be the case for sectors which were formerly
to a large degree state-owned (construction services, postal services, telecommuni-
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cations, transport services . . . ) and were in turn only to a lesser degree subject to
competitive pressure than their international counterparts. Prohibitive competition pol-
icy could be abused to shelter these industries from their more efficient international
competitors.
Alternatively, differences in the treatment of industries with respect to merger cases
could be interpreted as a proxy for industry concentration. If a certain branch is subject
to significantly harsher scrutiny than others, then - not taking into account effects con-
cerning the specifics of the respective industry - one would assume that the industry
under examination exhibits an already increased degree of concentration, causing the
competition authority to apply stricter measures to maintain the current level of compe-
tition.
We will check for industry effects on two levels: First, we use one-digit SIC codes to
classify our sample in five broad categories, namely manufacturing, trade, transporta-
tion, services and finance. After evaluating the effects on an aggregate industry level,
we refine our analysis by using two-digit SIC codes. Using only those industry dum-
mies which include at least 15 observations, this provides us with roughly 25 variables
for specific industries.
A regression of the outcome of merger cases on the SIC code of the enterprises in
question will show us if the proposition of industry-specific effects on the verdicts of the
Commission is supported by our data-set.
Additionally, we will check whether horizontal mergers - that is, mergers taking place
between two firms in the same branch of trade - are treated differently than vertical
or conglomerate mergers. Since horizontal mergers most directly influence concentra-
tion and in turn market power on the respective market, one might expect them to be
examined more scrupulously than vertical or conglomerate business combinations.
The test for joint significance
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After examining the above propositions, we will merge a selection of variables found
to be significant into a comprehensive model. This will show us how the individual
determinants interact in a general environment.
The results of this approach will be presented in two specifications: Firstly, we will
include most variables that have been found to be significant in other models (probably
all of them, except for some of the industry dummies to keep the model reasonably
parsimonious). This will undoubtedly cause a number of previously significant variables
to become insignificant.
We will thus, secondly, present a ’cleaned-up’ model, in which we discard most of the
insignificant regressors. This model will give us the most robust results, since its re-
gressors have been examined individually and in the joint model and were found to be
significant in both of them.
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To perform the statistical analysis necessary to answer the above questions we have
to combine a database containing information on the market data of companies with
one containing the merger information. The following section explains how this was
accomplished and elaborates on the variables and the statistical model employed in
the subsequent sections.
5.1 Construction of the data-set
Detailed data on all merger cases in the EU are available on the website of DG Compe-
tition17. This data-set is used to identify the merging parties and link their information.
For the market data of the enterprises the Global-Vantage database was utilized, which
offers a vast choice of data for the period 1990 - 2002.
From the total of 3388 mergers handled by the EU in the period from September 1990 to
April 2007, 2139 overlap with the data in Global-Vantage. We matched these mergers
with a global merger database via the names of the companies involved, obtaining
about 1200 matches for the 1991 - 2002 period. This step was necessary to link the
individual companies with their ’gvkey’, a unique identifier utilized by the Global-Vantage
database.
From these remaining matches, we were able to link a total of 655 to the Global-Vantage
data-base. These 655 matches are the working material for all statistical analysis per-
formed within this paper. They consist of 590 cases (90 percent) in which the merger
was granted unconditionally and of 65 cases (10 percent) subject to conditions and
obligations. 34 cases (5.2 percent) underwent an in-depth investigation. Table 1 gives
an overview of the decisions by year:
17http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/
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Table 1: Regulatory decisions by year
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the nationality of the companies concerned by year:
Table 2: Bidder nationality by year
Table 3: Target nationality by year
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The following table illustrates differences between phase I and phase II cases on the
basis of size-related variables. The overall mean values can be found in the next sub-
section.
Table 4: Means for phase I / phase II cases in million USD
Table 5 plots intra-EU mergers (both parties from the EU) against cross-border mergers
(at least one party is from a non-EU country).
Table 5: Intra-EU / cross-border mergers by year
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Finally, table 6 partitions intra-EU and cross-border mergers according to their regula-
tory treatment.
Table 6: Intra-EU / cross-border mergers by regulatory decision
The final 655 matches allow us to directly link the Global-Vantage data on the merg-
ing parties to the decisions of the Commission and to investigate interdependencies
between the former and the latter. 655 is the upper limit for the sample sizes in our
experiments; in numerous cases the sample size is reduced below that value by the
non-availability of certain variables for all companies concerned. While this is gener-
ally not a problem when using dummy variables, the utilization of variables that are not
available for all observations in some cases reduces the sample size below 300.
However, even after taking into account all constraints on the data-set it still remains
substantially larger than most of those employed in previous works econometrically
analyzing the decisions of DG Competition. The actual sample size for each regression
is specified at the bottom of the respective regression printout.
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5.2 Description of variables
The probit models in section 4 will estimate the significance of the following variables:
Variable Description
dealvalue Value of the merger in million USD
acq ta Acquirer total assets in million USD
t ta Target total assets in million USD
t ni Target net income in million USD
t irate Target net income divided by target total assets
acq debt Acquirer debt in million USD
acq drate Acquirer debt divided by acquirer total assets
t fail Equal to 1 if merger target is in the lowest 10 % percentile
of income distribution
bigeu Equal to 1 if acquiring company is situated in Germany,
France, Spain, Italy or the UK
t bigeu Equal to 1 if target company is situated in Germany,
France, Spain, Italy or the UK
us Acquirer is situated in US
t us Target is situated in US
eu Acquirer is situated in the EU
ger Acquirer is situated in Germany
fra Acquirer is situated in France
brittan Time dummy 1989 - 1993: 1 if in this period, 0 otherwise
miert Time dummy 1993 - 1999: 1 if in this period, 0 otherwise
monti Time dummy 1999 - 2002: 1 if in this period, 0 otherwise
hm3dummy Equal to 1 if the first three digits of acquirer’s and target’s
SIC code coincide
Manufacturing Acquirer/Target is in the manufacturing sector
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Trans., Comm.,Elec. Acquirer/Target is in the transportation, communications,
electric, gas or sanitary services sector
Trade Acquirer/Target is in the wholesale or retail trade sector
Finance Acquirer/Target is in the finance, insurance or real estate,
sector
Services Acquirer/Target is in the services sector
Food Acquirer/Target is in the Food and Kindred Products sector
Paper Acquirer/Target is in the Papers & Allied Products sector
Chemical Acquirer/Target is in the Chemicals & Allied Products
sector
Petroleum&Coal Acquirer/Target is in the Petroleum Refining And Related
Industries sector
Stone Acquirer/Target is in the Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete
Products sector
Metal Acquirer/Target is in the Primary Metal Industries sector
IndustrialMachines Acquirer/Target is in the Industrial And Commercial
Machinery And Computer Equipment sector
ElectricEquipment Acquirer/Target is in the Electronic And Other Electrical
Equipment And Components, Except Computer
Equipment sector
Transport Acquirer/Target is in the Transportation Services sector
Instruments Acquirer/Target is in the Measuring, Analyzing, And
Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical And
Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks sector
Communications Acquirer/Target is in the communications sector
Electric&GasServices Acquirer/Target is in the Electric, Gas, And Sanitary
Services sector
TradeDurableGoods Acquirer/Target is in the Wholesale Trade-durable
Goods sector
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TradeNondurableGoods Acquirer/Target is in the Wholesale Trade-non-durable
Goods sector
DepositoryInstitutions Acquirer/Target is in the Depository Institutions sector
InsuranceCarriers Acquirer/Target is in the Insurance Carriers sector
Nonclassifiable Acquirer/Target is in the Nonclassifiable Establishments
sector
The following table summarizes the statistical properties of the numerical variables.
Table 7: Statistical properties in million USD
Most of the variables estimated in the following section are dummy variables. Since
they only take the values 0 or 1, standard errors are of limited interest. Therefore, the
table summarizing them only includes the mean and the number of observations equal
to 1 for each dummy.
The observations for the SIC dummies include both acquirers and targets with SIC
codes in the respective categories. The observations counted as 1 are only those used
in the actual regressions.18
18That is, observations equal to 1 that were later dropped because the sample size fell below 15 are not
counted in this table.
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Table 8: Dummy observations
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5.3 Statistical method
To perform the econometric analysis of the data, we apply a probit model.19 This model
is appropriate when investigating binary dependent variables. It is often applied to
questions of unionism (join/not join) or buying decisions concerning large purchases
like cars or houses (buy/not buy).
The application of a multinomial probit model to investigate questions regarding deci-
sions taken by authorities was proposed by McFadden (1976) who studied the decision
rules underlying the freeway route selection by the California Division of Highways. The
first application of a logit model to assess an authorities’ decisions is Barton (1979),
examining the Federal Communication Commission.
In our case a binary probit model will suffice: the dependent variable is the decision
of the Commission to permit a given merger subject to conditions and obligations or
without them.
The general form of the model is
Yt = 1 if α+ βXt + ut > 0
Yt = 0 if α+ βXt + ut ≤ 0
By F (z) = P (Z ≤ z) we denote the cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal distribution. We can thus write P (Yt = 1) = P (ut > −α−βXt) = 1−F (−α−βXtσ )
and P (Yt = 0) = P (ut ≤ −α − βXt) = F (−α−βXtσ ) where σ denotes the standard
deviation.
19A logit model yields virtually the same results.
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The optimal parameters for the model are now obtained by maximizing the correspond-
ing likelihood function:
L =
∏
Yt=0
F (−α−βXtσ )
∏
Yt=1
[1− F (−α−βXtσ )]
This is done numerically in a number of iterative steps until the model converges to the
optimal parameters.
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6 The Results
6.1 The critical mass hypothesis
Returning to the first proposition of section 4 we now investigate the interdependency
of the outcome with several variables indicating the size of the companies concerned.
These variables evidently serve as proxies for the impact of the merger on market struc-
ture. As mentioned before, data on market shares are not included in our database. In-
stead we employ deal value, acquirer’s total assets and target’s total assets to account
for the size of the merger.
The original regression also contained data on the total sales of acquirers and targets.
Though partly significant, these regressors are very strongly correlated with total assets
and were therefore dropped from the final output.
The results are summarized in table 4:
Table 9: Estimation results critical mass hypothesis
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Deal value is significant in all three specifications with a positive coefficient. This is a
common result20 and supportive of the critical mass hypothesis.
In the phase II regression, acquirer’s total assets turn out to be significant. The nega-
tive coefficient seems puzzling at first but could be interpreted as evidence for lobbying
occurring during prolonged investigations of a merger case. This seems particularly
plausible since the result is significant for phase II decisions (where the extended time-
frame and the hearing of all parties permit lobbying) but not for phase I decisions (which
cannot realistically be influenced by the companies). The target’s total assets turn out
to be insignificant in all specifications of the model.
Since the coefficient for dealvalue is the largest significant coefficient in absolute size
- more than three times as large as that of acq ta - and the only one significant at a 1
% level we can safely conclude that the scrutiny of the proceedings by DG Competition
increases with the size of the merger.
20See for example Aktas et al. (2006).
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6.2 The failing firm defense hypothesis
We now turn to the examination of the failing firm defense hypothesis. The key variable
in this regression obviously is the income of the merger target. Target income has been
converted to an income rate through division by total assets. Additionally, we will check
for the effect of a dummy variable intended to capture the effect of particularly strong
cases of a ’failing firm’: t fail is equal to 1 if the respective firm is in the lowest 10 %
percentile of the income distribution, all firms in this percentile have negative incomes.
The results of regressing the merger outcomes on the target’s income, the acquirer’s
debt and the failing firm dummy can be found in table 10:
Table 10: Estimation results failing firm defense hypothesis
The coefficient for the target’s net income rate is significant in the first two specifications
on a 10 % level. In accordance with the failing firm defense concept, the parameter is
positive, meaning that the takeover of a target company experiencing negative profits
is more likely to be permitted without conditions than that of a target which fares well
economically.
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The failing firm dummy is not significant in the first two models and could not be esti-
mated in the third specification, because apparently none of the endangered companies
made it to phase II. This result suggests that the Commission is not over-proportionally
influenced by severe cases of firm failure.
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6.3 The protectionist hypothesis
The hypothesis that the EU discriminates between mergers on grounds of the nationality
has been devised numerous times, especially after the controversial merger decision
in the General Electric / Honeywell proceedings. In that specific case, the side of the
Atlantic the observer was on seemed to be an unbiased (even though ’biased’ probably
nails it better) estimator for their findings.
The general results with regard to the allegation of protectionism remain a contentious
issue. While some authors claim to have found evident interdependencies between
nationalities and outcomes of merger proceedings, others dispute this conclusion. Not
only about the existence, also about the direction of these supposed interdependencies
a consensus can not be found. Although most authors in favour of protectionism would
claim that the EU is herding their cattle, that is positively discriminating European firms,
some come to conclusions indicating the opposite.
Duso, Neven and Ro¨ller (2006) estimate the probability of type I and type II errors made
by the EU over a sample of 164 merger cases. They find that the probability of a type
II error (which corresponds to the clearing of a merger that has been evaluated as anti-
competitive by the stock market) increases by almost 26 % if one of the companies
involved is located in a big EU-country.21 Their finding is robust on a 9 % level and
evidently supports the hypothesis that political pressure from large member states can
influence the decisions of DG Competition in their favour. In a similar vein, Coate and
McChesney (1992) find that political pressure from the US Congress has a significant
influence on the decisions of the FTC.
Duso, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2006) reach very different conclusions. Using a similar
data-set their logit regression yields the result, that being in a large EU-country22 does
not have any significant influence on the outcome. Another interesting finding of theirs is
21France, Germany, Italy, Spain or the UK.
22France, Germany, Italy or the UK in this case.
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that while being an EU-member reduces the probability of DG Competition intervening,
being in the United States does even more so and additionally strongly increases the
probability of an unconditional clearance.
Employing a sample of 229 cases and a quite different methodology, Bougette and
Turolla (2006) surprisingly find that French and US acquirers are being negatively dis-
criminated. They are subject to a higher probability of conditions and obligations in the
merger outcome.
As already mentioned, Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2004) acquit the EU of the allegation
of protectionism. Studying a large sample of 602 major merger cases, they find no
evidence for the favouring of European firms. Their 2006 paper, however, finds that
competitive pressure exerted upon European rivals of the merging entity increases the
likelihood of intervention and even more so, if the acquiring firm is non-European.
Finally, a paper that absolves DG Competition of the accusation of being partial in either
direction is that by Bergman, Jakobsson and Razo (2005). The nationality of merging
companies influences neither the likelihood of a phase II investigation nor that of pro-
hibition. Khemani and Shapiro (1993) reach similar conclusions examining decisions
from Canadian competition authorities.
In our first regression, we try to estimate the influence of being in a large EU member
state versus that of being in the US. In both cases the merging parties supposedly
have strong political backup. In a second regression, we include dummy variables for
Germany and France. Since the results do not yield a lot of additional insight, they are
included in the appendix. The results of the first regression are summarized in table 11:
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Table 11: Estimation results protectionist hypothesis
The only significant variable in the overall specification is t bigeu. It is significant on a
10 % level and indicates that merger targets from the big EU countries increase the
likelihood of being cleared unconditionally by almost 5 %. 23 While bigeu, the variable
for the acquirers, is not 10 % significant, its t-value is only 0.05 lower than that of
t bigeu. Interestingly - if one is to accept the approximately equal significance of both
parameters - the effects of the two almost exactly cancel each other out.
In the phase I specification the bigeu variable is robustly significant with a p-value of
0.059 and indicates that mergers involving an acquirer from a big EU country have a
4.3 % higher probability of being curtailed by DG Competition. This is something new:
while previous studies have either found that big EU countries have an easier time of
getting their mergers through, or that they do not have any influence on the merger
authorities decision, the finding that big EU countries are actually subject to increased
scrutiny has - to our knowledge - not yet been published.
23This is obtained by estimating the marginal effect of the dummy variable switching from 0 to 1.
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6.4 The time hypothesis
In section 4, the hypothesis that the outcomes of merger proceedings could be depen-
dent on time, or more specifically, on the respective commissioner heading DG Com-
petition at that time, has been put forward. Our data-set allows us to investigate this
question for three commissioners: Leon Brittan, head of DG Competition from 1989 to
1993, Karel van Miert, head of DG Competition from 1993 to 1999 and Mario Monti,
who has headed DG Competition from 1999 to 2004.24
To test this hypothesis, time dummies for the periods corresponding to the terms of
office of the three different commissioners have been created. If a merger case falls in
the respective period the time dummy is 1, otherwise it is 0. We then investigated the
influence of these time dummies on the conditions and obligations variable, using our
standard probit model.
Since we employ an exhaustive25 set of dummy variables in this regression not all three
can be utilized at once due to issues of collinearity. This gives us a set of three possible
permutations of the regression, one of which we will examine here. The other two
regressions - one with the Monti and Miert dummies, the other including the Brittan and
the Miert dummies - are largely symmetric to the first and can be found in the appendix.
24Given the range of our data-set, we can only examine cases handled in the period 1999 - 2002. Since
this is still over 300 observations, we do not expect any statistical difficulties due to this constraint.
25Exhaustive in the sense that for every observation one of the dummy variables is equal to one. This
means that it is possible to create a linear combination of the unity vector, which implies perfect
collinearity.
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Table 12: Estimation results time hypothesis
If we regress the outcome of the proceedings on the dummies for commissioners Monti
and Brittan, we do get significant results in two of our three specifications: In the overall
specification as well as in the phase I specification the Monti dummy is 5 % significant
with a positive coefficient. The estimation of marginal effects shows that cases han-
dled by the Monti administration were approximately 5 % more likely to be subject to
intervention than the sample mean.
This result is in line with the findings of Schinkel et al. (2006) and Bougette and Turolla
(2006), which associate the period of office of Mario Monti with increased interventions.
In multiple specifications of Bougette’s and Turolla’s multinomial logit model, the Monti
dummy turns out to be 1 % significant.
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6.5 The industry hypothesis
We now return to the proposition that the industry of the companies involved in a given
deal might affect the outcome. This could be due to political motives to foster certain
branches by shielding them from effective competition. Evidently, this would be to the
detriment of the consumer.
Unfortunately, the data-set is not large enough to test for the influence of a very specific
branch on the likelihood of conditions and obligations. There are, for example, only 4
mergers involving construction companies in the data-set. Instead we have grouped the
sample via SIC codes into five broad categories: Manufacturing, transportation, trade,
services and finance. For each of these categories a dummy variable was created
(equal to 1 if the firm is in the corresponding industry, 0 otherwise). We examined the
influence of the acquirer’s as well as the target’s SIC code, giving us a total of 10 dummy
variables.
As already mentioned in section 4 we will also check for effects on a less aggregated
level by creating variables for smaller, more specific branches. To this end, 2-digit SIC
codes were used to create dummy variables for roughly 90 industries. Keeping only
those with at least 15 observations, we obtain 18 variables for the acquirers and 14 for
the targets.
The variable hm3dummy is the dummy for horizontal mergers we proposed earlier. It
takes the value 1 if the first three digits of acquirer’s and target’s SIC code are identical
and is 0 otherwise.
There are a few results missing in the regressions output. These estimations had to be
dropped due to issues of collinearity arising with the use of multiple dummy variables
(see footnote 25).
Let us first examine the regressions on the aggregated level:
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Table 13: Estimation results industry hypothesis 1
There is only one significant result on the acquirer’s side, namely the dummy for man-
ufacturing industries regressed on the phase II decisions. Robust on a 10 % level, the
coefficient implies that being in the manufacturing industry increases the likelihood of
a clearance subject to conditions and obligations by almost 8 %. This appears to be
compatible with Duso, Neven and Ro¨ller (2006) who estimate the interdependency of
branches and type II errors. They find that the manufacturing industry is 48 % less likely
to get an anti-competitive merger cleared than the sample mean.
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Table 14: Estimation results industry hypothesis 2
The regression on target SIC codes yields three significant results in phase II: the
dummy for transportation, communication and electricity, the one for services as well as
the trade dummy are significant on a 10 % level, the negative coefficient indicating that
being in those industries increases the probability of unconditional clearance by roughly
5.5 % for the former two sectors and by roughly 5 % for the trade sector.
Since the dummy variable for horizontal business combinations did not yield any feasi-
ble results in these two regressions, it will not be utilized in the 2-digit SIC regressions.
Apparently the aggregated SIC regressions lend only limited support to the hypothesis
of discrimination between industries: Significant results are only observed in phase II
regressions and very limited in number. This may, however, be due to an overly aggre-
gated point of view. Regarding only five categories it appears more than plausible that
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industry discrimination is being cancelled out by positive and negative discrimination
being present in the same category.
A more detailed picture is obtained by using the 2-digit SIC dummies. The results of
the regression using acquirer SIC codes is presented in the following table:
Table 15: Estimation results industry hypothesis 3
39
6 The Results
The overall regression indicates that three of the dummies are significant. With a t-
value of 3.42 the dummy for the chemical industry is significant on a 1 % level, t-values
of 2.33 and 1.97 indicate significance on a 5 % level for both the petroleum & coal and
the stone industry respectively. Since all of the parameters are positive, we conclude
that being in one of the aforementioned industries increases the chance of conditions
and obligations. The estimation of marginal effects provides us with a range 21 to 24 %
for that increase.
The chemical dummy remains (highly) significant in the phase I regression. The food
and insurance carrier dummies are significant on a 5 %- respectively 10 %-level. All
three dummy variables exhibit positive parameters suggesting that these branches are
being negatively discriminated.
Regarding the results of the phase II regression, we observe four significant results.
With t-values of 2.75 and 2.59, the paper and the petroleum and coal dummy are both
significant at 1 % levels, the t-value of 2.55 of the transport dummy grants significance
at a 5 % level, whereas the chemical dummy is only 10 % significant in this specification.
The regression of outcomes on target SIC codes can be found in the following table:
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Table 16: Estimation results industry hypothesis 4
In the overall specification, only the chemical dummy is significant at a 5 % level. Once
again the chemical industry appears to be treated more harshly than others: if the target
of a business combination is in the chemical industry, the probability of conditions and
obligations increases by almost 12 %.
We find no evidence for discrimination by industry in the phase I regression. In the
phase II regression the dummies for paper, metal and transport turn out to be significant,
each increasing the probability of invention by 10 - 13 %.
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The regressions using 2-digit SIC codes yield a more differentiated picture than the
aggregated regressions. We do find significant differences in the treatment of branches,
especially the chemical, petroleum & coal, paper and transport industries appear to be
subject to different handling.
While these results can be regarded as evidence for discrimination, they certainly are
not proof: Statistical differences in the treatment of branches could be entirely due
to differences in market structure and concentration. In fact, if we assume the EU
to be non-discriminatory between industries, the differences in severity of jurisdiction
allow us to draw conclusions as to the concentration of the industry in question, that is
merger jurisdiction could be used as a proxy for industry concentration. Even though
this explanation is tempting, it does not very well accord with empirical observations
of the market structure: Among those industries that seem to be the most harshly
judged - namely the paper industry, the transport industry, the chemical industry and the
petroleum & oil industry - only the petroleum & oil industry is heavily concentrated. In
the other three branches the aggregated market shares of the three biggest companies
do not exceed 40 %.26
Nonetheless the stern jurisdiction in these branches might be compatible with the de-
fense of effective markets and consumer surplus. Take for example the chemical and
paper industries. Both branches are characterized by largely homogenous products
and relatively high transportation costs (thus the transportation industry also enters the
equation). These factors facilitate the emergence of collusion among market partici-
pants.27 The increased harshness of merger jurisdiction could thus be explained as a
pre-emptive measure to avert inefficiencies in markets susceptible to collusion.
26see Deutscher Bundestag, ’Anlagenband zum Fu¨nfzehnten Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission’,
Drucksache 15/ 3611, 14.07.2004.
27The interested reader is referred to the case ICI/Solvay for the chemical industry and the so called
’woodpulp’ case for the paper industry.
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Similar investigations have been conducted by Duso, Neven and Ro¨ller (2006). They
find that being in the ’transportation, storage and communication’ industry significantly
increases the probability of getting a pro-competitive merger curbed, whereas being in
the ’manufacturing’ or ’financial intermediation’ industries decreases the likelihood of
getting an anti-competitive merger cleared.
Bougette and Turolla (2006) find that three sectors influence the merger decision: en-
ergy, communications and retail trade. The former two increase the likelihood of inter-
vention, possibly due to concentration issues linked to economies of scale and access
to key facilities, whereas the retail trade sector has a higher chance of being cleared
unconditionally.
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6.6 The joint model
After having examined individually the five propositions put forward in section 4, we will
now test them in a joint framework. To that end, we will select a choice of determinants
that have previously been found to be significant and plug them into the familiar probit
model.
The joint model contains the following variables from the previous hypotheses: from the
critical mass hypothesis we include dealvalue, from the failing firm defense hypothesis
we include t irate, from the protectionist hypothesis the bigeu and t bigeu variables are
included. Furthermore there’s the monti dummy from the time hypothesis and four SIC
dummies from the industry hypothesis, namely manufacturing, petrocoal, transport
and t chemical. Even though more SIC dummies were found to be significant in the
previous subsection, only the most robust industry results were selected.
Regressing these determinants in our usual model yields the following results:
44
6 The Results
Table 17: Estimation results joint model 1
Three variables turn out to be significant in the overall specification: dealvalue is 1 %
significant with a positive coefficient, very much like in the critical mass regression. The
monti dummy also remained significant in this setting, lending some robustness to the
finding of Mario Monti’s influence on the jurisdiction of the Commission and further con-
firming the results of Bougette and Turolla (2006) and Schinkel et al. (2006). Finally, the
result of the manufacturing dummy is similar to that found in table 13: 10 % significance
and a positive coefficient.
In the phase I specification the dealvalue variable remains significant and, surprisingly,
the bigeu dummy jumps to 5 % significance. As in our previous regression, the co-
efficient of bigeu is positive. This is an original and surprising result, indicating that
mergers involving acquirers from large, politically influential countries are, as a matter
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of fact, examined more scrupulously. The phase II regression once again confirms the
importance of dealvalue and the manufacturing dummy.
As announced in the predictions section, we will now attempt to further trim down this
model, weeding out insignificant regressors. Of course, this was achieved step by step,
eliminating insignificant variables one after another and using information criteria to
compare the models obtained. For the sake of brevity, only the final result of this iterative
elimination process will be presented here.
After stepwise elimination of t irate, t bigeu, petrocoal and transport, the final joint
model is presented in the following table.
Table 18: Estimation results joint model 2
The dealvalue variable turns out to be even more significant than in the previous regres-
sions: 1 % significance in all three specifications leaves little room for doubt as to this
determinant. The dummy variable for big EU countries also seems statistically stronger
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than in previous regressions: in the protectionist hypothesis subsection bigeu was 10 %
significant in the phase I specification, here we obtain 10 % significance in the overall
specification and 5 % significance in the phase I specification.
The result for the monti dummy resembles that obtained in the time hypothesis, namely
5 % significance in the overall and phase I specifications and a coefficient that corre-
sponds to an approximately 5.5 % increased probability of intervention.
Industry effects remain crucial as well. The manufacturing dummy is 1 % significant in
the overall and the phase II specification, the dummy for a merger target in the chemical
industry is 5 % significant in the overall regression. In all cases, the respective industries
are associated with an elevated likelihood of regulatory action.
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7 Conclusions
The aim of this thesis was to analyze empirically the determinants of the EC’s decisions
in merger cases with a community dimension. After a brief introduction to European
merger law and an overview of the relevant literature, five hypotheses concerning pos-
sible determinants were proposed. Then the data-set used for the regressions was
presented alongside with descriptions of the relevant regressors and statistical and
methodological remarks relevant to our subject matter.
Having taken care of all preliminary and introductory issues we then turned to the sta-
tistical evaluation of the propositions.
Our probably most robust finding, significant in various specifications of the model, is
the strong correlation of regulatory scrutiny and deal value. This finding is in line with
the conjecture that large mergers (in terms of financial volume) tend to have a stronger
impact on market structure and are therefore subject to increased scrupulousness of
regulators.
Examining the concept of failing firm defense - a notion that allows a so-called ’res-
cue merger’ to be cleared even if there are competitive concerns - we indeed find the
proposed positive correlation between the merger target’s income and the probability
of intervention. Accordingly, negative profits increase the probability of unconditional
clearance. This result, however, does not carry over to the joint model.
The investigations on the existence of protectionism and proneness to political pressure
from big countries yielded mixed and interesting results. On the one hand, we found
in one specification that merger targets from a big EU country decrease the probability
of intervention. On the other hand, we found that mergers involving acquirers from big
EU countries are actually more likely to be cleared with conditions and obligations. This
result is robust in the joint model as well and is - to our knowledge - an original finding.
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The results of our regression to evaluate the effects of different commissioners confirm
what has been widely suspected: Mergers in the era of Mario Monti had an increased
likelihood of regulatory intervention. This intuition has been statistically confirmed by
Bougette and Turolla (2006) and now receives further support from the larger data-set
employed in this paper.
Our evaluation of industry effects on an aggregate level indicated negative discrimina-
tion against the manufacturing branch, a result that retained its significance even in the
joint setting. The finding of positive discrimination in case of targets from the transport,
communications and electricity industry as well as from the trade industry did not carry
over to the joint model. Evaluating on a less aggregated level we found industry ef-
fects in multiple branches. The strongest and most robust influences were found for the
chemical, petroleum & coal and transport services industries. However, only the finding
of negative discrimination against the chemical industry remained significant in the joint
model.
In conclusion, the results we obtained from the data-set at hand are - to a large extent
- in line with predominant results in the literature. Most of our findings confirm what our
intuition would have predicted. The most surprising finding is probably that of increased
scrutiny in cases with acquirers from a large EU country. Apart from that, our results
blend in nicely with the choir of previous investigations on the subject.
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Time dummy regression
Table 19: Estimation results time hypothesis 2
Estimating the influence of Mario Monti on outcomes against that of his predecessor,
Karel van Miert, we find no statistically significant evidence for a difference. This corre-
sponds to the findings of Bergman et al. (2005).
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Table 20: Estimation results time hypothesis 3
The regression with the Miert and Brittan dummies is largely symmetric to that printed
in the text. The coefficient for Miert is negative, indicating increased lenience, whereas
that for Monti is positive, which corresponds to stricter rulings.
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Protectionist regression
Table 21: Estimation results protectionist hypothesis
The results are quite similar to the regression in the text. Dummies for Germany and
France (which were found to be significant by i.e. Bougette and Turolla (2006)) do not
appear to have any influence in this regression.
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Zusammenfassung
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Diplomarbeit ist es, die Determinanten der Rechtssprechung
der EU Kommssion in Fusionsfa¨llen empirisch zu ermitteln. Als Grundlage fu¨r diese
Analyse dient ein Datensatz von 655 Fusionsfa¨llen aus den Jahren 1990 bis 2002, die
von der Kommission hinsichtlich ihrer Kompatibilita¨t mit dem gemeinsamen Markt unter-
sucht wurden. Diese Fa¨lle wurden mit einer umfassenden Datenbank verknu¨pft, welche
uns Details zu den Rahmenbedingungen der jeweiligen Fusion liefert. Die zum Ein-
satz kommende statistische Methode ist, der bina¨ren Natur der zu erkla¨renden Variable
(genehmigt ohne Auflagen, genehmigt mit Auflagen) entsprechend, ein Probit Modell.
Basierend auf fu¨nf Arbeitshypothesen werden fu¨nf verschiedene Modelle konstruiert,
welche untersuchen ob die jeweilige Hypothese vom Datensatz empirisch unterstu¨tzt
wird. Die Ergebnisse werden interpretiert, mit der relevanten Literatur verglichen und
schließlich werden die statistisch signifikantesten Variablen in einem gemeinsamen,
umfassenden Modell auf ihren Einfluß hin untersucht.
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